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#Batch image resizer malware Patch
#Batch image resizer malware code
#Batch image resizer malware windows 7
#Batch image resizer malware windows

In deployment the Raccine.ADMX file goes in C:\Windows\PolicyDefinitions. The folder GPO includes Raccine.ADMX and Raccine.ADML.

0.6.0 - Additional checks for bcdedit.exe /set Deploy Configuration via GPO.

#Batch image resizer malware code

0.5.1 - Improvements by 0.5.2 - Additional check for delete shadowstorage by code review by application icon.0.5.0 - Removed Eventlog logging (basic info was unnecessary cuased higher complexity can be achieved by process creation logging as well), support for wbadmin filtering.0.4.2 - Bugfixes provided by John Lambert.

#Batch image resizer malware windows

0.4.0 - Supports logging to the Windows Eventlog for each blocked attempt, looks for more malicious parameter combinations.

0.3.0 - Supports the wmic method calling delete shadowcopy, no outputs for whitelisted process starts (avoids problems with wmic output processing).

0.2.1 - Removed explorer.exe from the whitelist.

0.2.0 - Version that blocks only vssadmin.exe executions that contain delete and shadows in their command line and otherwise pass all parameters to a new process that invokes vssadmin with its original parameters.

0.1.0 - Initial version that intercepted & blocked all vssadmin.exe executions.

or the other blocked command lines are frequently or sporadically used for legitimate purposes in which case you should refrain from using Raccine. If you have a solid security monitoring that logs all process executions, you could check your logs to see if vssadmin.exe delete shadows, vssadmin.exe resize shadowstorage. It will not only block that request but kills all processes in that tree including the backup solution and its invoking process. This could break various backup solutions that run that specific command during their work.

#Batch image resizer malware Patch

You won't be able to run commands that use the blacklisted commands on a raccinated machine anymore until your apply the uninstall patch raccine-reg-patch-uninstall.reg. Powershell list of encoded commands: JAB, SQBFAF, SQBuAH, SUVYI, cwBhA, aWV4I, aQBlAHgA and many more ExampleĮmotet with Raccine - Link (ignore the process activity that is related to the Raccine installation) ^ outdated list: check the corresponding YARA rule

win32_shadowcopy or element from a list of encoded commands (powershell).

delete and catalog and -quiet (wbadmin).

delete and shadows (vssadmin, diskshadow).

Raccine shows a command line window with the killed PIDs for 5 seconds, logs it to the Windows Eventlog and then exits itself.

If a malicious combination could be found, we collect all PIDs of parent processes and the start killing them (this should be the malware processes as shown in the screenshots above).

If no malicious combination could be found, we create a new process with the original command line parameters.We then process the command line arguments and look for malicious combinations using Yara rules.

Invocation of vssadmin.exe (and wmic.exe) gets intercepted and passed to raccine.exe as debugger ( vssadmin.exe delete shadows becomes raccine.xe vssadmin.exe delete shadows).This won't catch methods in which the malicious process isn't one of the processes in the tree that has invoked vssadmin.exe (e.g.It even kills the processes that tried to invoke vssadmin.exe delete shadows, which could be a backup process.The legitimate use of vssadmin.exe delete shadows (or any other blacklisted combination) isn't possible anymore.No running executable or additional service required (agent-less).

#Batch image resizer malware windows 7

Runs on Windows 7 / Windows 2008 R2 or higher.Flexible YARA rule scanning of command line params for malicious activity.We don't have to replace a system file ( vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe), which could lead to integrity problems and could break our raccination on each patch day.Raccine is a binary, that first collects all PIDs of the parent processes and then tries to kill all parent processes. We register a debugger for vssadmin.exe (and wmic.exe), which is our compiled raccine.exe. What if we could just intercept that request and kill the invoking process? Let's try to create a simple vaccine. We see ransomware delete all shadow copies using vssadmin pretty often.